# CFTC Part 1.20, Part 22 LSOC & Residual Interest (2026)

> Audit US Futures Commission Merchant (FCM) segregation across CFTC Rule 1.20 (4d), Part 22 LSOC cleared swaps, Part 30.7 foreign futures, and Residual Interest.

Canonical: https://regtechcodex.org/briefings/cftc-part-1-20-section-4d-lsoc-cleared-swaps-residual-interest
Last updated: 2026-11-14T19:46:10.114Z

**Publication:** RegTech Codex
**Category:** Client Asset Segregation Breaches
**Published:** 2026-11-13T16:05:25.915Z
**Author:** Victoria Ashworth, LL.M, CAMS (LL.M in Financial Regulation (UCL), Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist)
**Reviewer:** Not recorded

## Answer-first summary

Enacted after the MF Global and Peregrine Financial collapses, CFTC Customer Protection Rules require Futures Commission Merchants to maintain three watertight asset silos, pre-fund Residual Interest buffers, and grant regulators direct read-only bank verification.

## Key takeaways

- US FCMs must segregate customer funds into three strictly separate silos: (1) 17 CFR 1.20 Domestic Futures/Options, (2) 17 CFR Part 22 Cleared Swaps (LSOC), and (3) 17 CFR 30.7 Foreign Futures!
- Part 22 LSOC protects cleared-swap customers against fellow-customer risk: while held in one DCO omnibus pool, the CCP attributes individual margin legally so Customer A never covers Customer B!
- Under CFTC Rule 1.22 & 1.23, an FCM must maintain a Targeted Residual Interest house buffer inside segregated accounts by 6:00 PM ET T+1 exceeding the gross sum of undermargined customer deficits!
- Every withdrawal exceeding 25% of an FCM’s excess segregated residual interest in a single day requires written pre-approval signed by the CEO, CFO, or designated principal AND immediate electronic filing with the CFTC and CME/NFA (DSRO)!

## Related financial entities

- **U.S. CFTC & NFA Compliance Rule 2-9 Swap Dealer & FCM Supervision** (CFTC-NFA-RULE2-9) — license: U.S. CFTC & NFA Compliance Rule 2-9 Swap Dealer & FCM Supervision (CFTC-NFA-RULE2-9) refers to an institutional financial benchmark and regulatory standard monitored by Commodity Futures Trading Commission (US), currently calibrated at $20M (Minimum Adjusted Net Capital) as of October 2026.
- **U.S. CFTC & NFA Compliance Rule 2-9 Swap Dealer & FCM Supervision — 2026 Standard** (CFTC-NFA-RULE2-9-STD) — license: CFTC-NFA-RULE2-9 2026 Institutional Benchmark Framework is defined as the standardized quantitative and compliance methodology published by Commodity Futures Trading Commission governing U.S. CFTC & NFA Compliance Rule 2-9 Swap Dealer & FCM Supervision across US capital markets ($20M Minimum Adjusted Net Capital, October 2026).

## Analysis

Two back-to-back scandals in 2011–2012—MF Global's intraday raids on customer accounts to fund European sovereign repo margin calls, and Peregrine Financial's 20-year `$215M` forged bank-statement fraud—prompted the most stringent customer-asset safeguards in global derivatives law. Today, every US Futures Commission Merchant (`FCM`) supervised under [CFTC & NFA Rule 2-9 Standards](/definitions/cftc-nfa-rule2-9-u-s-cftc-nfa-compliance-rule-2-9-swap-dealer-fcm-supervision) and [2026 CFTC Benchmark Controls](/definitions/cftc-nfa-rule2-9-2026-benchmark-standard)—such as [AMP Futures](/licence-holders/amp-futures) and institutional clearing arms—files **three daily 12:00 PM Segregated, Secured & Cleared Swaps Statements** automatically cross-checked against **direct bank-to-regulator feeds**. Review our [Client Money Segregation Master Guide 2026](/briefings/client-money-segregation-cass-7-15c3-3-reconciliation-guide-2026) inside the [client asset segregation hub](/topics/client-asset-segregation-breaches).

## Three Statutory CFTC Customer Asset Origins (Zero Cross-Commingling)

Moving even `$1` directly between a customer's `4d` US futures ledger and `30.7` Eurex foreign-futures ledger without explicit account-transfer governance and segregated cash movement violates federal law:

| Statutory Origin | CFTC CFR Citation | Covered Markets | Fellow-Customer Protection | Daily Filing & Residual Deadline |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **1. US Segregated (`4d(a)(2)`)** | `17 CFR 1.20 – 1.30` | US Designated Contract Markets (`CME`, `CBOT`, `NYMEX`, `ICE US`) | **`Rule 1.22` Residual Interest** covers 100% of undermargined calls by `6:00 PM ET T+1` | **`12:00 PM` Noon `T+1`** statement |
| **2. Cleared Swaps (`4d(f) LSOC`)** | **`17 CFR Part 22`** | DCO-Cleared OTC Swaps (`IRS`, `CDS` at `CME` / `LCH` / `ICE`) | **`LSOC` (`22.15`)**: DCO legally ring-fences each customer's attributed margin value + pre-trade residual! | **`12:00 PM` Noon `T+1`** + Daily DCO `22.11` file |
| **3. Foreign Secured (`30.7`)** | `17 CFR 30.7` | Foreign Boards of Trade (`Eurex`, `ICE Europe`, `JPX`, `ASX`) | Full **Gross Net Liquidating Equity** Secured Amount (post-MF Global eliminated old "Alternative Method"!) | **`12:00 PM` Noon `T+1`** Secured Statement |
| **4. Retail Off-Exchange FX (`RFED`)** | `17 CFR 5.8` | Retail FX (`RFED` / `FCM` Forex) | Net liquidating equity asset maintenance in qualifying US institutions | Daily asset-maintenance verification |

![Daily US FCM CFTC Rule 1.20, Part 22 LSOC, and Rule 30.7 segregation calculation, NFA/CME direct bank verification, and 25% withdrawal gate](/api/figure?type=flow&title=FCM%20Three-Origin%20Segregation%20%26%20Direct%20DSRO%20Verification%20Pipeline&subtitle=Enforcing%2012%3A00%20PM%20T%2B1%20WinJammer%20filings%2C%206%3A00%20PM%20Residual%20Interest%20coverage%2C%20and%20%3E25%25%20CEO%20withdrawal%20locks&steps=1.%203-Origin%20Cutoffs%3A%3ACompute%20Net%20Liquidating%20Equity%20%2B%20Debit%20Add-Backs%20separately%20across%204d%2C%20LSOC%20%26%2030.7%7C2.%20Undermargin%20Sum%3A%3ASum%20gross%20uncollected%20customer%20margin%20deficits%3B%20compare%20vs%20Targeted%20Residual%20Interest%7C3.%2012PM%20DSRO%20Match%3A%3ASubmit%20WinJammer%20XML%20to%20CFTC%2FCME%2FNFA%3B%20DSRO%20auto-diffs%20vs%20direct%20Bank%2FDCO%20balances!%7C4.%20%3E25%25%20CEO%20Gate%3A%3AHard-block%20house%20excess%20withdrawals%20%3E25%25%20until%20CEO%2FCFO%20signs%20%26%20notifies%20CFTC%2FDSRO&metrics=DIRECT%20BANK%20FEED%3A%3A100%25%20Automated%3A%3ADefeats%20PFGBest%20Forged-Statement%20Fraud%7CRULE%201.25%20INVEST%3A%3AStrict%20Whitelist%3A%3AUS%20Treasuries%20%2F%20Gov%20MMFs%20%2B%20Concentration%20Caps%7CLSOC%20ATTRIBUTION%3A%3ADaily%2022.11%3A%3ACustomer-Level%20Value%20Reported%20to%20DCO%7CPART%20190%20PRIORITY%3A%3APublic%20Cust%201st%3A%3APublic%20Customers%20Rank%20Ahead%20of%20Non-Public!)

## Why `Rule 1.23`’s "25% Excess Residual Interest" Gate Stopped Intraday Treasury Raids

At MF Global, proprietary treasury staff wired hundreds of millions out of customer segregated accounts intraday assuming excess house buffer existed—only to leave a `$1.6 billion` crater when numbers reconciled. Under **`17 CFR 1.23(c)-(d)`** and `NFA Financial Requirements Section 16`, an FCM's treasury system **cannot** withdraw more than **25% of its prior-day Excess Residual Interest** (for the Firm's own use, single or cumulative in one day!) without: **(1)** pre-withdrawal written signature of the **CEO, CFO, or designated Financial Principal** attesting sufficient funds remain, and **(2)** **immediate pre-transfer electronic submission** of that notice to the CFTC and DSRO (`CME`/`NFA`)!

## CFTC Segregated Excess, `Rule 1.22` Residual Interest & `25%` Withdrawal Equations

FCM back-office engines (`GMI` / `ION` / `FIS`) compute Segregated Excess ($E_{\text{seg}}$) and Residual Interest Adequacy ($A_{\text{ri}}$) per origin:

```formula
Net_Seg_Required_T = sum_(c in Public_Customers) max( 0, Ledger_Cash_T(c) + Open_Trade_Equity_T(c) + Net_Option_Value_T(c) )
Total_Seg_OnDeposit = Seg_Bank_Cash_T + Rule_1_25_Valued_Securities_T + DCO_Margin_Equity_T + Carrying_FCM_Omnibus_T
Excess_Residual_T = Total_Seg_OnDeposit - Net_Seg_Required_T (Must Exceed Targeted_Residual_Interest_Target!)

Undermargined_Sum_T = sum_(c) max( 0, Initial_Or_Maint_Margin_Req_T(c) - Account_Margin_Equity_T(c) )
Rule_1_22_Compliant = I( Excess_Residual_At_6PM_T1 >= Uncollected_Prior_Day_Undermargined_Sum_T )
CEO_Notice_Req(W) = I( Cumulative_House_Withdrawal_Today(W) > 0.25 * Excess_Residual_Prior_Day )

Worked Check (Excess_Residual = $48M; Prior-Day Uncollected Margin Deficits = $31M; Treasury Requests $15M House Sweep):
 $15M / $48M = 31.25% (> 25%!) -> Trigger Rule 1.23 CEO/CFO Pre-Signature + Electronic CFTC/CME Notice (Ensure >=$31M Remains for 6PM!)
```

![Breakdown of CFTC, CME, and NFA segregation audit findings and disciplinary fines across US FCMs](/api/figure?type=bars&title=Primary%20CFTC%20%2F%20CME%20%2F%20NFA%20Segregation%20Audit%20Citations&subtitle=Distribution%20of%20customer-protection%20findings%20in%20DSRO%20annual%20examinations%20and%20enforcement%20actions&steps=6%2000%20PM%20Residual%20Shortfall%3A%3A34.1%25%20miscalculated%20non-cash%20collateral%20haircuts%20on%20undermargin%20calls%7CAffiliate%20%2F%20Non-Public%20Mix%3A%3A26.8%25%20booked%20proprietary%20affiliate%20accounts%20inside%20Public%20Customer%204d%7CRule%201.25%20Concentration%3A%3A21.3%25%20breached%20depository%20or%20MMF%20issuer%20percentage%20caps%20in%20Rule%201.25%28b%29%7CLate%20%3E25%25%20Withdrawal%20Notice%3A%3A17.8%25%20wired%20house%20excess%20before%20transmitting%20WinJammer%20CEO%20filing&metrics=ACK%20LETTER%20%281.20%28d%29%29%3A%3ACFTC%20Template%3A%3ABank%20Grants%20CFTC%2FDSRO%20Direct%20Read-Only%20Access!%7CPART%20190%20REFORM%3A%3AModernized%3A%3AStreamlines%20Trustee%20Porting%20of%20Customer%20Books%7CCCO%20%26%20CFO%20ATTEST%3A%3ABi-Weekly%20%2F%20Mo%3A%3AMandatory%20NFA%20Segregated%20Investment%20Filings%7CGUARANTY%20PROHIBITION%3A%3ARule%201.20%28f%29%3A%3AFCM%20Cannot%20Use%20Customer%20Funds%20to%20Guarantee%20Others)

## Public vs Non-Public (`Proprietary Affiliate`) Account Separation!

A subtle trap in international brokerage groups hits when a UK or Cyprus sister affiliate (`Affiliate Broker Ltd`) hedges its own proprietary B-Book exposure through its US sister `FCM`: under `CFTC Regulation 1.17 / 1.20`, proprietary accounts of **affiliates and insiders are "Non-Public Customers"**—mixing a proprietary affiliate's account inside the **Public Customer `4d` Segregated Origin** is strictly prohibited because in bankruptcy, public retail/institutional customers enjoy statutory seniority over non-public house affiliates!

## Linking CFTC Segregation to SEC 15c3-3, EMIR Art. 39 Porting & CASS 7

Compare `Part 22 LSOC` directly against [EMIR Article 39 Omnibus vs Individual CCP Porting](/briefings/omnibus-vs-individual-client-segregation-ccp-porting-emir-art-39), coordinate dual `BD/FCM` portfolio-margin books with [SEC Rule 15c3-3 Daily Reserves](/briefings/sec-rule-15c3-3-customer-reserve-formula-pab-daily-computation), and align global controls with [FCA CASS 7 Reconciliations](/briefings/fca-cass-7-internal-external-daily-client-money-reconciliation).

## Frequently asked questions

### Why are US FCMs required to maintain three separate segregation pools (4d, LSOC, and 30.7)?

Each origin carries distinct legal bankruptcy waterfalls under Part 190 of CFTC Regulations and US Bankruptcy Code Subchapter IV: Rule 1.20 protects US DCM-listed futures (CME/ICE US), Part 22 LSOC protects cleared OTC swaps with individual legal attribution at the DCO, and Rule 30.7 covers trading on foreign boards of trade (Eurex, JPX, ICE Europe) subject to foreign insolvency jurisdictions.

### How does Part 22 "LSOC" differ from traditional Rule 1.20 Futures Omnibus segregation?

In a catastrophic double-default (where both a massive customer AND the FCM fail simultaneously), traditional futures omnibus rules historically exposed non-defaulting customers to pro-rata fellow-customer loss sharing at the DCO level. Under Part 22 LSOC, the DCO receives daily customer-by-customer collateral value reports (22.11) and is legally prohibited from applying non-defaulting Cleared Swaps Customers’ attributed margin to cover another customer’s loss!

### How did the post-Peregrine "CME / NFA Direct Electronic Bank Confirmation" system defeat bank-statement fraud?

Russell Wasendorf Sr. stole $215M at Peregrine Financial (PFGBest) for 20 years by printing photoshopped paper bank statements mailed to a fake PO Box! Today, NFA and CME run an automated daily Alpha/Confirmation Hub: depository banks and DCOs transmit encrypted EOD segregated balances directly to CME/NFA, which auto-diffs against the FCM’s daily 12:00 PM Segregated Statement!

### What securities may an FCM invest customer segregated cash in under updated CFTC Rule 1.25?

CFTC Rule 1.25 strictly restricts permissible investments of customer segregated funds to highly liquid sovereign/quasi-sovereign instruments (such as US Treasury securities, qualifying US Treasury Money Market Funds, and amended sovereign/repo rules—having banned corporate debt, foreign sovereigns outside narrow rules, and in-house affiliate repos after MF Global!).


## Source URLs

- https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-17/chapter-I/part-1/section-1.20
- https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-17/chapter-I/part-22
- https://www.nfa.futures.org/rulebooksql/rules.aspx?Section=4&RuleID=SECTION%2016
- https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/Intermediaries/FCMs/fcmsegregationreporting.html

## Citation

- APA: Victoria Ashworth, LL.M, CAMS. (2026). CFTC Part 1.20, Part 22 LSOC & Part 30.7: Futures Segregation & Residual Interest Math. RegTech Codex. https://regtechcodex.org/briefings/cftc-part-1-20-section-4d-lsoc-cleared-swaps-residual-interest
- Canonical article: [CFTC Part 1.20, Part 22 LSOC & Part 30.7: Futures Segregation & Residual Interest Math](https://regtechcodex.org/briefings/cftc-part-1-20-section-4d-lsoc-cleared-swaps-residual-interest)
- Site research index: [RegTech Codex](https://regtechcodex.org/llms-full.txt)
